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EDELMAN V. JORDAN: PROTECTION OF THE GOVERNMENT
OR PROTECTION FROM THE GOVERNMENT?
When Illinois and Cook County officials administering
federal-state programs of aid to the aged, blind and disabled (AABD)
refused to process respondent Jordan's claim for four months, he filed
a federal civil rights class action' alleging that the rules under which
the defendant state officials operated 2 were inconsistent with federal
law requiring prompt action on AABD claims 3 and that the processing
of similar claims in less time denied him the equal protection of the
law. He requested declaratory and injunctive relief and punitive dam-
ages. The district court granted an injunction requiring the officials to
comply with the federal time limits, and it ordered retroactive pay-
ment of benefits illegally delayed. No punitive damages were allowed.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed. 4 Because of a conflict with a recent decision of the Second
Circuit, 5 the Supreme Court granted certiorari. In reversing and re-
manding, the Court held: (1) The eleventh amendment bars a federal
court from awarding to a state citizen retroactive welfare benefits
which have been wrongfully withheld, and (2) a state does not waive its
eleventh amendment immunity merely by participating in the AABD
program. Edelman v. Jordan, 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974).
Without explicit reference to the eleventh amendment, 6 cases in
substantial numbers since 1968 have allowed declaratory and injunc-
tive relief in suits to compel state welfare officials to obey federal
welfare regulations. 7 In some cases the Supreme Court even affirmed
decisions awarding retroactive payments from the treasury of the
1. The complaint, filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, alleged a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), and federal jurisdiction by virtue
of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3), (4) (1970).
2. The rules were sections 4004.1, 8255, and 8255.1 of the Categorical Assistance Manual of
the Illinois Department of Public Aid. The rules permitted AABD officials to take a maximum of
30 days for the aged or blind and a maximum of 45 days for the disabled to determine whether an
applicant was eligible for assistance. Thereafter, as much as a month of additional delay was
permitted before the first check was required to be mailed.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (1969); 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a) (3) (1973). The time limits required
the officials to deny eligibility or to mail the first check within 30 days for the aged or blind and
within 45 days for the disabled. Effective January 1, 1974, the AABD program has been
replaced. 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
4. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973).
5. Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972).
6. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The amend-
ment has consistently been interpreted to preclude suits against states by their own citizens as
well. See note 27 infra and accompanying text.
7. E.g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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state8 without reference to the eleventh amendment. On the other
hand, where the eleventh amendment has been explicitly interpreted,
it has been held an absolute bar to the award of any monies from a
state's treasury without the consent of the state. 9 Equitable remedies
like mandamus and injunction could be obtained to compel a state
official to obey the law,' 0 but the rationale in these cases was that the
suit was not really one against the state. Illegal acts by state officials
are ultra vires and suits to prevent such acts are, therefore, against the
defendants as private individuals."'
Edelman recognized the inconsistency represented by the recent
welfare cases requiring payments in the nature of damages and equita-
ble relief from state treasuries 12 and the earlier cases decided explicitly
under the eleventh amendment which denied such payments. The
Court removed the uncertainty engendered by the simultaneous exis-
tence of two contrary lines of decision by choosing a compromise.
Hereafter, the federal courts may compel a state to comply prospec-
tively with federal welfare requirements even when compliance re-
quires the expenditure of monies from the state's treasury,' 3 but re-
troactive payments in the nature of damages or equitable restitution
may not be awarded without the consent of the state to be sued. 14
Edelman also stabilized the law in a related and important area of
eleventh amendment interpretation. It has long been held that a state
may waive its immunity by voluntary participation in a suit affecting
the state's interests."i It was established that a state's consent to be
sued in its own courts did not by implication permit suit against the
state in the federal courts.' 6 With a few exceptions' 7 weighing the
degree of appearance required by a state to constitute a waiver under
the principle of Clark v. Barnard, 18 the law was applied with
monotonous uniformity until 1959.19 Absent willing participation or
8. E.g., Department of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918(1972); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
9. Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1882). This was true even though the funds were
specifically reserved by the state treasurer for payment to holders of the bonds on which suit was
brought. Professor Jaffee considers this case one of the two most important in the evolution of
1 th amendment interpretation. Jaffee, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Im-
munity, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1963). The other case is Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
10. Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1875).
11. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273
(1906); Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537 (1903); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Tindal v.
Wesley, 167 U.S. 204 (1897).
12. See cases cited at notes 7 and 8 supra.
13. 94 S. Ct. at 1358, citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
14. Cases holding to the contrary by implication were expressly disapproved. 94 S. Ct. at
1360.
15. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883).
16. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900).
17. E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Missouri v.
Fiske, 290 U.S. 18 (1933).
18. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
19. Kennecott Copper Co. v. State Tax Comm'r, 327 U.S. 573 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v.
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express waiver, the state's interests could not be litigated without its
consent, even in a suit in which the state was not named a party.20
Two decisions on waiver began to unsettle the old scheme, how-
ever. In Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission21 the Court
permitted suit on the ground that the state had by implication waived
its eleventh amendment immunity when it voluntarily joined an inter-
state compact approved by Congress. This was extended in Parden v.
Terminal Railway22 which held that by operating a railroad in inter-
state commerce, the state had waived its immunity to suit under the
Federal Employees Liability Act. 23 The Court said that the state
surrendered part of its sovereignty when it dealt with matters such as
interstate commerce over which the Constitution gives supreme power
to Congress. The question of whether these holdings would be further
extended to all suits involving federal questions was expressly reserved
in Maryland v. Wirtz .2 4 Edelman firmly answered the question in the
negative. .2
The Court, in a 5-4 decision delivered by Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
asserted four propositions which led to the result obtained. The first
was that "[w]hile the Amendment by its terms does not bar suits
against a State by its own citizens . . . an unconsenting State is
[nonetheless] immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own
citizens .... "26 This proposition has been so firmly established by the
authorities cited by the Court 27 that it would hardly have needed
mention were it not for Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent on the point.
28
The second proposition, asserted without dissent, is also well
established. The Court held that "even though a state is not named a
party to the action, the suit may nonetheless be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. '29 Again a long line of cases more than adequately
supports the proposition.30
Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Worchester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S.
292 (1937); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311 (1920). See Pugh, Historical Approach to the
Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. REv. 476 (1953).
20. Cunningham v. Macon & B.R.R., 109 U.S. 446 (1883).
21. 359 U.S. 275 (1959) [hereinafter referred to as Petty].
22. 377 U.S. 184 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as Parden].
23. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1939).
24. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
25. "Constructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of
constitutional rights, and we see no place for it here." 94 S. Ct. at 1360-61.
26. 94 S. Ct. at 1355.
27. The rationale for so interpreting the amendment is the same as that used to justify the
sovereign immunity enjoyed by the federal government without benefit of an express constitu-
tional provision. The argument is presented in United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
'28. 94 S. Ct. at 1367. The dissent seems frivolous in that it cited no cases which have held to
the contrary. The leading case is Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), and it has been followed
without exception. See, e.g., the authorities cited by the Court, 94 S. Ct. at 1355.
29. 94 S. Ct. at 1355.
30. E.g., the cases cited by the Court, 94 S. Ct. at 1356. The earliest decisions held to the
contrary. Osborne v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 737 (9 Wheat. 738) (1824), followed in
Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203 (1872), but these were soon overruled. In Cunningham v.
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The remainder of the Court's argument is more controversial. The
third proposition asserted by the majority is that even where the
challenged action of the state officials is illegal or unconstitutional
under federal law, the eleventh amendment bars a judgment for re-
troactive damages or equitable restitution when such judgment must
be paid from the treasury of the state. 31- This required the disapproval
of several recent cases32 and drew a vigorous, if not rigorous, dissent
from Mr. Justice Douglas. 33 Had this decision been rendered prior to
Shapiro v. Thompson 34 there would scarcely have been any reason to
note it, but since Shapiro, a line of authority relied on by Mr. Justice
Douglas has permitted such awards35 and by implication held the
amendment no bar thereto.
Within the time periods toward which each looks, both the major-
ity opinion and the dissent are well founded. The recent cases cited in
the dissent did not, however, expressly decide the matter and, on
balance, the majority opinion seems better. Adoption of the dissenting
view would amount to judicial repeal of the eleventh amendment
where federal questions are concerned, and the Court should be hesi-
tant to so weaken the protection afforded by the Constitution against
federal power.
The final proposition drew a dissenting opinion authored by Mr.
Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Marshall. 36 Answering the question
left unresolved since Maryland v. Wirtz, 37 the Court held that
[t]he mere fact that a State participates in a program through
which the Federal Government provides assistance for the
operation by the State of a system of public aid is not
sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to be
sued in the federal courts. 38
Once again, the Court returned to the law as it was applied during the
earlier part of this century, and once again the dissent was based on
the more recent cases. Until Petty and Parden, 39 there was no doctrine
recognizing an "implied waiver" of eleventh amendment rights. The
Macon & B.R.R., 109 U.S. 446 (1883), the Court barred a suit by the holder of a second
mortgage to set aside a foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property to the state by the holder of the
first mortgage. The Court found the suit to be one against the state even though the state was not
a named party to the action. The Court limited its holding in Davis and distinguished Osborne.
The subterfuge of distinguishing and delimiting was finally dropped and the modern position
adopted in In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887), where the Court established the "real party in
interest" rule.
31. 94 S. Ct. at 1356-59.
32. Id. at 1359-60.
33. Id. at 1363,
34. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
35. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
36. 94 S. Ct. at 1368.
37. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
38. 94 S. Ct. at 1361.
39. See notes 20 and 21 supra and accompanying text.
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dissent found the approach in Petty controlling, 40 but the states in-
volved in that situation had joined an interstate compact which ex-
pressly provided for suit against member states, and the question of
waiver turned on whether Congress had intended that provision to
abrogate eleventh amendment immunity. The majority properly dis-
tinguished the case41 since no such provision appeared in the federal
regulations here involved. Parden was similarly distinguished 42 as
involving a commercial venture of a kind not relevant to the situation
in Edelman.
The result is a good one. "Constructive consent is not a doctrine
commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights."
43 It
would have been better, in fact, if the Court's language had been
stronger and completely unambiguous. The Court's implication 44 that
a civil rights action by a citizen against his state might be permitted
45
under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if Congress so intended, is
contrary both to the spirit of the amendment and to the spirit and the
balance of the decision. To the extent that it dealt with Congress at all,
the amendment dealt with congressional power, not congressional
intent. The Court should have made it quite clear that Congress
cannot by statute abrogate a constitutional right, and that a state's
waiver must be informed and deliberate to be effective.
Edelman v. Jordan gives some new vitality to the unjust and
archaic doctrine of sovereign immunity, 46 but it also revitalizes the
important idea that the Constitution is meant to serve as a limit on the
power of the federal government-a limit not to be laid aside for the
convenience of the moment. Considering the legislative trend away
from sovereign immunity, 47 the lasting effect of this case may be
salutary since the major threat to justice for the foreseeable future
seems to be the ever-expanding power of the federal bureaucracy. In
the short run, the case stabilizes the law and reaffirms the traditional
cases on state sovereign immunity while allowing the courts to inter-
vene to halt continuing violations of federal law. This should enable
attorneys and the courts to select appropriate forms of action and
remedies more confidently.
FRANCIS J. MERCERET
40. 94 S. Ct. at 1372.
41. Id. at 1360.
42. Id.
43. Id. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1965).
44. 94 S. Ct. at 1361-62.
45. But see Kates and Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131 (1972).
46. See, e.g., Jorden v, Metropolitan Util. Dist., 498 F.2d 514 (8th Cir. 1974); San Antonio
Con. Soc. v. Texas Hwy. Dept., 496 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1974); Rodriguez v. Swank, 496 F.2d
1110 (7th Cir. 1974); Adams v. Hardon, 493 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1974), each expressly relying on the
authority of Edelman v. Jordan.
47. See, e.g., Kionka, The King is Dead, Long Live the King: State Sovereign Immunity in
Illinois, 59 ILL. B.J. 660 (1971).
